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Abstract
To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn
complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to
judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the
task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose
training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action,
two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the
agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with
optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging
answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions
about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the
meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents
compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier’s accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9%
given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and
practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up,
and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.
1 Introduction
Learning to align an agent’s actions with the values and preferences of humans is a key challenge in
ensuring that advanced AI systems remain safe [Russell et al., 2016]. Subtle problems in alignment
can lead to unexpected and potentially unsafe behavior [Amodei et al., 2016], and we expect this
problem to get worse as systems become more capable. Alignment is a training-time problem: it
is difficult to retroactively fix the behavior and incentives of trained unaligned agents. Alignment
likely requires interaction with humans during training, but care is required in choosing the precise
form of the interaction as supervising the agent may itself be a challenging cognitive task.
For some tasks it is harder to bring behavior in line with human goals than for others. In simple
cases, humans can directly demonstrate the behavior—this is the case of supervised learning or
imitation learning, for example classifying an image or using a robotic gripper to pick up a block.
For these tasks alignment with human preferences can in principle be achieved by imitating the
human, and is implicit in existing ML approaches (although issues of bias in the training data still
arise, see e.g. Mitchell and Shadlen [2018]). Taking a step up in alignment difficulty, some tasks are
too difficult for a human to perform, but a human can still judge the quality of behavior or answers
once shown to them—for example a robot doing a backflip in an unnatural action space. This is
the case of human preference-based reinforcement learning [Christiano et al., 2017]. We can make
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an analogy between these two levels and the complexity classes P and NP: answers that can be
computed easily and answers that can be checked easily.
Just as there are problems harder than P or NP in complexity theory, lining up behavior with human
preferences can be harder still. A human may be unable to judge whether an explained answer or
exhibited behavior is correct: the behavior may be too hard to understand without help, or the
answer to a question may have a flaw that is too subtle for the human to detect. We could imagine
a system trained to both give answers and point out flaws in answers; this gives a third level of
difficulty. Flaws themselves may be too hard to judge: flaws could have their own flaws that must
be pointed out to a human. And flaws of flaws can have flaws, etc.
This hierarchy of alignment tasks has a natural limit: a debate between competing agents where
agents make arguments, other agents poke holes in those arguments, and so on until we have enough
information to decide the truth. The simplest version of debate has two competing agents, though we
cover versions with more agents as well. Our hypothesis is that optimal play in this game produces
honest, aligned information far beyond the capabilities of the human judge. We can approximate
optimal play by training ML systems via self play, which has shown impressive performance in games
such as Go, chess, shogi, and Dota 2 [Silver et al., 2016, 2017a,b, OpenAI, 2017].
The goal of this paper is to lay out theoretical and practical properties of debate as an approach to
AI alignment. We also lay out plans for experiments to test the properties of debate, but we leave
these to future work except for a simple MNIST example. On the theoretical side, we observe that
the complexity class analog of debate can answer any question in PSPACE using only polynomial
time judges, corresponding to aligned agents exponentially smarter than the judge. Whether debate
works with humans and ML is more subtle, and requires extensive testing and analysis before the
model can be trusted. Debate is closely related to the amplification approach to AI alignment
[Christiano et al., 2018], and we explore this relationship in detail.
Our eventual goal is natural language debate, where the human judges a dialog between the agents.
However, unrestricted dialog models remain far from human performance and even evaluation is
difficult [Lowe et al., 2017a], so it is instructive to consider debates with non-natural language
statements. Consider the board game Go. Given a board configuration, we can ask “What is the
best move?” If AlphaZero [Silver et al., 2017b] shows us a move, there is no way to judge its quality
unless we are roughly as strong as AlphaZero. However, we can ask another copy of AlphaZero to
show us a countermove, then a countermove to that countermove, and so on until the game ends.
Even a novice player can judge this debate: the side with the higher score wins. Indeed, we can
view AlphaZero as our debate model with human judge replaced with rules of Go, which gives us
confidence that the model can achieve superhuman performance.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the debate model of alignment and pro-
vides intuitive and theoretical background for why it is useful. Section 3 proposes initial experiments
to test human and ML aspects of debate, using image tasks to avoid the complexities of natural
language. We present results for an example experiment on MNIST, but we leave the majority of
experiments to future work. The remaining sections provide additional thought experiments and
analysis: Section 4 and Section 5 discuss reasons for optimism and pessimism about debate as a
model for AI alignment, Section 6 presents variants of debate to reduce asymmetry or incorporate
multiple agents, and Section 7 relates debate to the amplification approach to AI alignment and
describes how the two models can be hybridized. Section 8 closes with requests for future work.
2
2 The debate game
We will initially consider a question-answering setting, though Section 2.3 covers other settings
including environment interaction. We have a set of questions Q, answers A, and debate statements
S. The simplest version of debate has two agents competing to convince a human judge:
1. A question q ∈ Q is shown to both agents.
2. The two agents state their answers a0, a1 ∈ A (which may be the same).
3. The two agents take turns making statements s0, s1, . . . , sn−1 ∈ S.
4. The judge sees the debate (q, a, s) and decides which agent wins.
5. The game is zero sum: each agent maximizes their probability of winning.
To play this game with a human, we need instructions for how the human should decide who wins.
These instructions are in natural language, such as “The winner is the agent who said the most
useful true thing.” For question-answering a ∈ A and s ∈ S could be any moderate length sentence,
and q ∈ Q a sentence plus additional context. For example, q ∈ Q could be “Should we interview
Eve?” given a resume and links to past work. At test time it suffices to stop after step 2: we do not
need to run the debate (though agents could simulate debates at test time to strengthen answers).
The utility of debate as an approach for AI alignment rests on the following central claim:
Claim. In the debate game, it is harder to lie than to refute a lie.
Whether this claim is true for any particular setting is empirical, though we give some evidence for
it below. If the central claim is true, we can hope for a few other claims:
• In all Nash equilibria1 of this game, both agents try to tell the truth in the most convincing
manner possible, trying to uncover details or counterarguments the other agent missed.
• It is possible to find approximate Nash equilibria with some version of gradient descent, such
as a self play algorithm similar to Silver et al. [2017b]. In particular, training is stable around
the Nash equilibria (unstable training might mean agents learn to be honest, forget how to
defend against dishonesty, and then get beaten by dishonest fluctuations).
• At Nash equilibria, debate agents are approximately as strong as unrestricted AI (agents
trained with no safety measures).
We emphasize that using debate does not restrict the structure of the agents. Similarly, the deep
networks used in Silver et al. [2017b] are convolutional residual networks unrelated to the game
tree of Go, though the training process does involve the tree via MCTS. The lack of restriction is
important, since we want safe approaches to be competitive with unsafe alternatives.
2.1 Short debates are powerful
Consider the question “Where should I go on vacation?” If one sees only the answer “Alaska”, it
is not obvious whether a better answer exists. Thus the opening answers in a debate about the
vacation question between two agents Alice and Bob might be
1. Alice: Alaska.
2. Bob: Bali.
1We say Nash equilibria instead of optimal play since (1) we will consider versions where turns are simultaneous
and (2) choosing a limited capacity model can make a perfect information game act as an imperfect information game.
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Figure 1: (a) Given a question, two debating agents alternate statements until a limit is reached, and a human judges who
gave the most true, useful information. Although the reason for the correct answer may be the exponentially large tree of
all possible debates, a single path chosen by strong agents provides evidence for the whole tree. (b) Analogously, although
the best move in Go depends on the entire tree, a single game with strong players is evidence as to which moves were best.
If the human judge is able to rank pairs of vacation destinations, perfect play in a two round debate
is sufficient to find the optimal destination. If Alice gives a suboptimal destination, Bob gives a
better destination and wins, so Alice only wins by starting with the best destination. In this case
Bali sounds warmer, so Bob wins. However, Bali has a hidden flaw:
3. Alice: Bali is out since your passport won’t arrive in time.
Now the human understands they cannot go to Bali, so Alice wins, unless Bob has a counterargument
to the flaw:
4. Bob: Expedited passport service only takes two weeks.
The process continues until we arrive at a statement that the human is able to correctly judge, in
the sense that the other agent does not believe they can change the human’s mind with yet another
statement and resigns. We do not stop when the human thinks they can correctly judge: after step
(2) the human may have thought Bali was obviously correct, not remembering the passport issue;
after step (3) the human may think Alaska is correct, being unaware of expedited service.
What we do not do is list all arguments relevant to the vacation question: Bali has nicer beaches,
Alaska is colder on average but pleasantly warm in the summer, it is currently February, Hawaii
is both warm and in the U.S. Instead, optimal play in debate picks out a single line of argument,
and agents which switch arguments admit defeat and lose. This is unnatural in a human discussion
where both sides learn from each other over the course of the debate, but we are interested in the
equilibrium of training where both agents are assumed to be using the best arguments available.
For example, if the third statement had been
3. Alice: Wait, no...Hawaii!
then Bob should win, since Bali was a sufficient counterargument to Alaska.
Figure 1(a) illustrates this situation. A single round of the debate game traces out one path through
the space of all possible arguments. The reason for the answer is the entire tree: all points and
counterpoints relevant to deciding the issue. The tree is too large to show to a human, but a single
path through the tree chosen by sufficiently strong adversarial agents is evidence of the result from
the entire tree. Figure 1(b) has the analogous situation for Go: the correct first move is determined
by the entire tree, but one game between strong players provides evidence as to the correct move.
Thus debates can be short because they are unbranched: they cover only one path through the
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Steps Formula Complexity class ML algorithm
0 H(q) P = Σ0P supervised learning (SL)
1 ∃x.H(q, x) NP = Σ1P reinforcement learning (RL)
2 ∃x∀y.H(q, x, y) Σ2P two round games
...
...
...
...
n ∃x0∀x1 · · · ∃xn−1.H(q, x0, . . .) ΣnP n round games
poly ∃x0∀x1 · · · .H(q, x0, . . .) PSPACE variable round games
Table 1: As we increase the number of steps, the complexity class analog of debate moves up the polynomial hierarchy. A
fixed number of steps n gives the polynomial hierarchy level ΣnP, and a polynomial number of steps gives PSPACE.
tree. Long arguments are usually long only because they cover many different arguments and
subarguments: the length is due to branching down many paths. Arguments which seem irreducibly
long because they are phrased as a sequential process can be rearranged into a shallow tree by stating
the conclusion of the first half of the argument, then choosing which half to discuss in detail. We
can make this rearrangement precise in the complexity theory setting, as we discuss next.
2.2 Complexity theory analogies: DEBATE = PSPACE
Although debate is intended for use with fuzzy humans as judges, we can gain intuition about the
model by replacing the human with an arbitrary polynomial time algorithm H : Q → {0, 1} which
takes some input statement q ∈ Q and produces one bit: whether the statement is true or false. We
allow our ML models arbitrary computational power: the only limitation is the supervision signal.
If we use H to answer questions directly as H(q), we get the complexity class P of polynomial time
algorithms. As discussed in Section 1, this setup corresponds to supervised learning. With sufficient
training data and model capacity we can fit any algorithm, but we cannot go beyond the training
data (except by removing unsystematic errors).
If we use the polynomial time algorithm not to output answers but to judge them, we get the
complexity class NP of questions with polynomial time checkable witnesses. Instead of H(q) we
output ∃x.H(q, x) where x is a witness found by the ML model. NP corresponds to single agent
reinforcement learning: an agent with sufficient capacity can solve tasks the human cannot, but the
human must be able to judge whether the solution is good.
Now consider an adversarial debate of length two, where Alice chooses x attempting to make the
human say yes, Bob chooses y attempting to make the human say no, and the human decides who
is correct. The result is ∃x∀y.H(q, x, y). Alice wins if she can find x such that all responses y by
Bob have H(q, x, y) = 1. Bob wins if he can find a response y to any x that Alice says so that
H(q, x, y) = 0. This complexity class is Σ2P, two steps up the polynomial hierarchy, since Σ2P
contains all questions answerable as formulas of the form ∃x∀y.H(q, x, y) for polynomial time H.
We can continue this process for any number of rounds, with Alice and Bob alternating points and
counterpoints, producing the formula ∃x0∀x1 · · · ∃xn−1.H(q, x0, . . .) for n rounds of debate. If n is
fixed, the complexity class is ΣnP: n steps up the polynomial hierarchy PH = Σ0P ∪ Σ1P ∪ · · · . If
the number of rounds n is allowed to grow polynomially in the size of the question q, the complexity
class is PSPACE: all questions decidable by polynomial space algorithms [Sipser, 2013]. Table 1
shows the progression. To summarize,
Theorem 1. For any problem L ∈ PSPACE, we can choose a polynomial time judge so that optimal
play in the debate game with polynomially many steps solves L.
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Proof. Given L, by Theorem 8.9 of Sipser [2013] we can choose H and n = poly(|q|) such that q ∈ L
iff ∃x0∀x1 · · · ∃xn−1.H(q, x0, . . .). As above, debate with H as the judge answers q ∈ L.
PSPACE is a powerful complexity class. Examples of PSPACE problems include
• Simulating a temporal process (e.g. physics) for an exponential number of steps, as long as the
state is polynomial size.
• Recursion over an exponentially large tree, as long as the depth is polynomial size.
• Perfect play in any competitive game of polynomial length, such as turn limited Go.
• Counting an exponentially large collection of objects, where each object is polynomially check-
able (such counting problems are also in the smaller complexity class #P ( PSPACE).
For an example of the latter, consider counting the exact number of primes pi(x) = pi(2n) up to n
bits. We can check individual numbers for primality in polynomial time, but there are 2n numbers
to check and the best known algorithm is O(2n2+) [Lagarias and Odlyzko, 1987]. The problem is in
PSPACE since we can loop over the exponentially many numbers and maintain the polynomial size
count. To solve this problem using debate, we ask Alice to compute pi(x) and pi(x/2). If Alice is
lying about pi(x), she must be lying about one of the half ranges [0, x/2) and [x/2, x); Bob can point
out which range [a, b) is a lie. Alice must then justify herself by computing pi(a+b2 ), Bob points out
which of [a, a+b2 ), [
a+b
2 , b) is a lie, and so on until Alice is lying or not about a singleton interval {p}.
H then checks p for primality to determine who wins. Here the judge must perform only addition
and subtraction as the steps progress, and check a single number for primality at the end. Optimal
play in this game is for Alice to tell the truth about pi(x) at the start: Bob has no winning response.
Similarly, if we have a polynomial time algorithm for one step of a simulation, we can use debate to
evolve the simulation for an exponential number of steps n. Alice gives the result after n and n/2
steps, Bob says which half interval is a lie, Alice gives the midpoint, and we iterate until Alice and
Bob are making different claims about a single step of simulation.2
The game case is particularly natural: two agents can debate whether the game of Go is a win or a
loss for the first player by playing a game of Go. The human judge checks the rules and counts the
score to see who wins. Analogously, an amateur Go player can estimate which of two professional
players is better by watching them play one game. The winner is likely better, even though the
amateur cannot evaluate the moves directly.
These complexity class arguments are analogies only: we do not expect tractable machine learning
algorithms to achieve all of PSPACE. Rather, the analogies show that at least in theory we can be
limited only by the capacity of the ML models and our ability to train them, not the supervisory
signal. This gives us hope that debate could resolve AI alignment without sacrificing model strength.
2.3 Removing oversimplifications
The simple version of debate discussed in Section 2 does not capture many tasks we care about.
There are several directions in which we can improve the model:
• Queries may be too big: A question may be too large to show to a human, or to expect the
human to comprehend. q ∈ Q might include a 10 gigapixel image (“Does this picture of the
sky support cosmic inflation?”), the whole internet (“What is the best article about cats?”),
etc. To support large context, we let the agents reveal small parts of q in their statements. For
example, an agent could reveal part of a webpage or a small region of the 10 gigapixel image.
2Unfortunately this debate protocol for simulation works only for deterministic simulation (see Section 5.9).
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An extreme example is where q ∈ Q contains an image and agents can reveal only one pixel
of the image (Section 3.2). Debate only works if this revealed context cannot be a lie: it is
impossible to usefully debate whether a coin flip is heads or tails if the coin is never revealed.
• Answers may be too big: Similarly, the best answer to a question may be prohibitively
large. For example, the answer may be a long document: “Give a 100 page summary of the
effectiveness of quantitative easing.” To support large responses, we still have agents choose
a response at the start of the game and allow them to reveal small parts of either answer in
the same way they reveal parts of the question. If Bob is misaligned and constructs an answer
which would have bad consequences, Alice will be able to safely warn about the risks during
the debate while most of the answer is hidden (as long as our safety claims are true).
• Human time is expensive: We may lack enough human time to judge every debate, which
we can address by training ML models to predict human reward as in Christiano et al. [2017].
Most debates can be judged by the reward predictor rather than by the humans themselves.
Critically, the reward predictors do not need to be as smart as the agents by our assumption
that judging debates is easier than debating, so they can be trained with less data. We can
measure how closely a reward predictor matches a human by showing the same debate to both.
• Environment interaction: If we want a system to take actions that affect the environment
such as operating a robot, the desired output is a sequence of actions a0, a1, . . . where each
action can only be computed once the previous action is taken. In this case we need one debate
per action, though at test time we can again stop once the actions are computed.
• Long term state: Each debate is an independent game, but agents could use information
from past debates to make better decisions as in Mishra et al. [2017]. Since games are zero sum
this does not change optimal play, as any equilibria in an iterated zero sum game is weakly
dominated by a strategy which treats each game as separate.
We will use the large query case for our experiment, but leave other generalizations to future work.
3 Experiments: proposed and preliminary
Since the theoretical limit of infinite compute agents and polynomial time judges gives all of PSPACE,
whether debate works in practice as a method for AI alignment is an empirical question about
practical ML systems and actual human judges. Thus, we need experiments to explore whether near
optimal play produces aligned behavior with human judges, and whether we can find near optimal
play with practical ML.
Although we believe the best equilibrium for debate is two honest agents, in the experiments dis-
cussed here we prespecify one agent as honest and one as liar. This is particularly useful with human
agents, since humans may be intrinsically inclined to tell the truth in ways ML agents would not
be. If the honest agent wins against any liar in an experiment, we will have shown that honesty is
the optimal strategy, and that an agent trained to optimal play would become honest.
A key goal of debate is aligning ML systems more capable than humans at a particular task, which
is difficult to arrange directly since existing systems are mostly weaker than humans. Instead, we
can give the agents access to a source of information that the judge cannot see, and limit the amount
of information conveyed in the debate. That is, we replace “thinks better” with “knows more”.
Ideally we want experiments that combine both human and ML aspects of debate. Until natural
language capabilities progress further, however, there are aspects of debate with human judges more
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Figure 2: The MNIST debate game. A random MNIST image is shown to the two debating agents but not the judge. The
debaters state their claimed label up front, then reveal one nonzero pixel per turn to the judge up to a total of 4 or 6. The
judge sees the sparse mask of 4 or 6 pixels and chooses the winner based on which of the two labels has higher logit. The
judge is trained in advance to recognize MNIST from random masks of nonzero pixels.
Pixels First player Judge accuracy Honest win rate(random pixels) No precommit Precommit
honest 51.0% 83.8%
4 liar 48.2% 68.4% 86.7%
mean 59.7% 85.2%
honest 67.4% 87.4%
6 liar 59.4% 81.5% 90.4%
mean 74.4% 88.9%
Table 2: Results for debate on MNIST. We prespecify one player as honest and one as liar: when the honest player wins
honesty is the best strategy. No precommit means the liar wins for any incorrect guess by the judge, even if the incorrect
guess differs for different parts of the game tree. Lying is harder in the Precommit case, where the liar states their claim
in advance of making moves and cannot change their story. With or without precommit, the honest player wins more often
than a random judge, showing that honesty has an advantage.
easily tested using human debaters as well. Thus we consider both pure human experiments which
mix natural language and images, and pure ML experiments using images alone.
3.1 ML experiment: convincing a sparse classifier
Metaphorically, debate targets the situation where the agents see the big picture, but the judge
cannot. We can model this by replacing the metaphorical big picture with an actual picture, chosen
at random from a distribution. If the image is simple enough, we can do away with natural language
entirely: the two agents state their claimed image class up front, then reveal one pixel of the image
per turn to the judge. They cannot lie about these pixels, but a dishonest player could choose them
adversarially to fool the judge. The game ends after a fixed number of turns, then the judge sees a
sparse mask of the revealed pixels and decides which agent’s class is correct.
We have performed an initial version of this experiment on MNIST, using ML agents and an ML
judge. Figure 2 shows the structure of the game. Similar to Milli et al. [2017], we train the judge in
advance with supervised learning, using a convolutional net that sees a sparse mask of a few pixels.
The judge is treated as fixed when computing optimal play by the agents. Joint training of agents
and judge together would be particularly bad as a test of debate, since it assumes knowledge of the
truth at game time which is exactly what we hope to do without.
Concretely, the judge is trained to classify MNIST from 6 (resp. 4) nonzero pixels, with the pixels
chosen at random at training time. The judge receives two input feature planes: a {0, 1} mask of
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Figure 3: Confusion matrices with diagonal set to zero for the 6 pixel MNIST judge (a) on random pixels and (b) for debate
with precommit, which correspond to accuracies 59.4% and 88.9%, respectively. Errors for random masks are distributed
somewhat randomly, while successful lies in debate are concentrated on digits 8 and 9. For example, it is particularly easy
to convince the judge that a 5 is actually an 8, or a 4 is a 9. This is likely an artifact of restricting the game to nonzero
pixels: an honest debater could prove a digit is not 8 by showing black where 8 would be white.
which pixels were revealed and the value of the revealed pixels (with zeros elsewhere). We used
the architecture from the TensorFlow MNIST layers tutorial;3 the only difference is the input. We
train the judges using Adam with a learning rate of 10−4 for 30k (resp. 50k) batches of 128 samples,
reaching 59.4% (resp. 48.2%) accuracy.
With the judge fixed, we define the debate game as shown in Fig. 2. The two players precommit to
their claimed label up front, then reveal one pixel per turn up to a total of 6 (resp. 4). In the 6 pixel
case, this means each player reveals 3 pixels. We prespecify one player to be honest and one to lie: if
the honest player wins this implies honesty is the optimal strategy. The winner is the player whose
claimed class has higher logit when the sparse mask is shown to the judge, ignoring the logits for the
other 8 classes. We also consider debate without precommit: the judge uses the maximum logit over
all 10 classes and any incorrect guess by the judge is a win for the liar. Precommit makes the game
harder for a liar even though they can choose the precommitted lie arbitrarily, since the liar cannot
adapt the lie based on moves already played. Precommit more accurately reflects the intended
behavior of debate as described in Section 2.1; we include the harder version for illustration. Both
versions give an advantage to the second player to move: if the first player has a winning strategy,
the second player can steal that strategy by ignoring the previous move on each turn.
The MNIST debate game is simple enough that we can play it with pure Monte Carlo Tree Search
[Coulom, 2006] without training a heuristic as in Silver et al. [2017a]. We use 10k rollouts per move,
where each rollout descends to a leaf for evaluation using the judge. During rollouts, we select nodes
to expand using the PUCT variant in Silver et al. [2017a]: at node s we pick action a to maximize
U(s, a) = cpuctP
√∑
bN(s, b)
1 +N(s, a)
where cpuct = 1, P = 1/(#nonzero pixels) is constant since we do not train a heuristic, and N(s, a)
is the visit count. Ties are broken randomly. We play out games by choosing moves with the highest
visit count. To model precommit, we play 9 different games for the same image with the 9 possible
3See https://www.tensorflow.org/tutorials/layers#building_the_cnn_mnist_classifier.
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Figure 4: Sample 6 pixel MNIST debate games where the liar must precommit to the lie. (a) through (d) vary who plays
first and who wins between honest player and liar. Honest moves are shown in green and liar moves in blue, with digits 0
through 5 indicating the move sequence (We apologize to physical paper readers without the ability to zoom). For each
game, we show the debater view on the left and the judge view on the right: the judge sees only the revealed pixels and which
class each player is arguing for. An interactive version of this figure is available at https://blog.openai.com/debate.
lies; the liar wins if any lie wins. Taking the best liar performance over 9 games gives an advantage
to the liar since it is a minimum over noisy MCTS; we reduce this noise and better approximate
optimal play by taking the mean over 3 games with different seeds for each lie. Since we use MCTS
on the test set with full access to the judge, we are modeling the limit of debate agents with no
generalization error (though the judge does have generalization error).
Results are shown in Table 2, with sample games in Fig. 4. With 6 pixels, debate with precommit
turns a 59.4% accurate judge into a 88.9% accurate debate: the judge wins on 88.9% of the images
in the MNIST test set. With 4 pixels, a 48.2% accurate judge becomes an 85.2% accurate debate.
For both 4 and 6 pixels precommit is crucial: the liar does much better if the lie can adapt in
different parts of the game tree. This reflects why short debates are powerful in theory: declaring
the argument to be made in advance cuts down the space of arguments that must be covered.
Without the mean over 3 seeds adjustment for precommit, the honest player wins 87.7% of the time
with 6 pixels and 83.8% with 4 pixels.
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Figure 5: A prototype website to test single pixel image debate with humans: https://debate-game.openai.com. An
image is shown to two debaters but hidden from the judge. The debaters can talk to the judge and draw rectangles on the
image, and each debater is allowed to reveal one pixel to the judge over the whole game. Image credit: Gideon Bünder,
https://www.flickr.com/photos/123640488@N05/40799813725.
3.2 Human experiment: cat vs. dog
To test human and natural language aspects of debate, we can play a similar image debate replacing
all ML agents with humans. Choose a random image of either a cat or a dog, and show the image to
both human agents but not the human judge. The agents engage in a natural language debate, and
each agent is allowed to reveal a single pixel of the image to the judge. They cannot lie about this
pixel, but they can reveal only one pixel total over the whole debate. After the debate, the judge
decides who is telling the truth. A similar game could be played with Wikipedia pages and a budget
of one word, again using the unseen Wikipedia page to model extra capabilities not available to the
judge. Note that both agents could choose to be honest purely out of inclination, so it is useful to
randomly choose sides so that one agent is forced to lie.
We have built a prototype website to play the single pixel image debate game with human debaters
and judge: https://debate-game.openai.com. A screenshot is shown in Fig. 5. In addition to
natural language, the agents can draw rectangles on the image; the judge sees these rectangles on a
blank background. We have used the website to play cat vs. dog informally, and as long as agents
know how to play it is extremely difficult to lie. Thus, even if one of the agents is incentivized to lie,
the honest agent usually wins. The one pixel constraint is not serious, as Alice can claim in natural
language that a pixel has a certain color. If Bob knows this is a lie, he can win by spending his
one pixel budget, so not spending it is an admission that Alice is telling the truth. Thus the only
limitation is the length of the debate, and whether the human understands it.
For example, Alice might honestly claim the image is a cat, and Bob lies and claims it is a dog. Alice
can say “The center of this small rectangle is the cat’s green eye.” Bob cannot admit the center is
an eye, so he concocts a further lie: “It’s a dog playing in grass, and that’s a blade of grass.” But
this lie is hard to square with surrounding facts, such as Alice’s reply “If it were grass there would
be green at the top or bottom of this thin rectangle.” The debate continues until the agents focus in
on a particular pixel which they disagree on, but where Bob is unable to invent a plausible counter,
at which point Alice reveals the pixel and wins.
We leave formal experiments testing whether honesty wins in single pixel debate to future work.
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Figure 6: If a question cannot be resolved with a short debate, it is important that the winning strategy admits ignorance
and justifies that ignorance. In the game tree setting, an example is trees whose values depend on deep paths and are
undetermined if restricted to low depth. Consider a debate about whether the trees shown have value V ≤ 4, with the
restriction that we can only play two moves (not three). (a) The min player can prove V ≤ 4 by playing towards the 4 or
the 2, so proving ignorance is impossible. (b) V = 5, but max can prove ignorance up to depth 2 by playing towards the
deep path and stopping at the second max node. min can only avoid the deep path by playing 10, which is higher.
Even if those experiments are successful, however, it is easy to be skeptical that debate works for
complex moral questions while still believing it works for cat vs. dog. In particular, will humans be
convincible away from initially wrong moral sentiments? One possibility is to pick a domain where
isolated human answers are prone to bias, then ask how switching from one to two or three step
debates changes the level of bias.
4 Reasons for optimism
The theoretical arguments of Section 2.2 and preliminary experiments of Section 3 do not capture the
richness of debate with humans. The rest of the paper considers the prospects of extending debate
to more complex tasks and advanced AI agents, including discussion and thought experiments about
natural language debate with human judges. We start with reasons for optimism, and discuss worries
about the safety properties of debate in Section 5. Section 6 considers variations on debate, and
Section 7 discusses the related amplification approach to AI alignment.
4.1 Agents can admit ignorance
Despite the large complexity class debate can reach in theory, we do not expect the model to solve
all problems. Therefore, it is important to ask what happens for questions too hard to answer, either
because the agents do not know or because the debate would take too much time. Otherwise, we
might worry that questions too hard to answer result in misleading or wrong answers, with no way
to distinguish these from truth.
To preserve honest behavior, the human judge should be instructed to reward agents that admit
ignorance and successfully argue that ignorance is justified. The requirement to successfully argue
for ignorance is necessary, since debate is useless if an agent can successfully admit ignorance to
any question. For the best vacation question, Alice could argue the question is hard to answer with
confidence because Bali and Alaska are too dissimilar to compare. To counter this admission of
ignorance, Bob would need to exhibit an advantage of Bali not contradicted by an advantage of
Alaska the human considers incomparable.
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Figure 6 illustrates ignorance in the complexity theory setting. Consider finding optimal play in a
variable length game with a debate of length 100. If the losing player can delay their loss for more
than 100 moves, Alice can say “This game will go on too long to resolve in 100 steps.” They can
then play the game adversarially for 100 steps, with Bob playing to win quickly and Alice playing to
delay the loss. If Bob wins within 100 moves, he has proven that the game can be decided quickly;
otherwise Alice has proven the game value is determined by paths which are too deep.4
There is a balance issue to admitting ignorance: debate is useless if optimal play is to argue we can
never know anything for certain. Failure to strike this balance is measurable only in part: we would
know if Alice is admitting ignorance so often that debate is useless, but may not know if Alice should
be admitting ignorance but Bob is unable to win by pointing that out.
4.2 No one is forced to lie
In contrast to a legal argument or a typical competitive debate, the two players in this game are
allowed to choose what they are arguing for, including both arguing for the same thing. There is
no adversary rewarded for fooling the human, which is good because (1) we do not know what that
means a priori and (2) we are not explicitly training agents for deception. Our hope is that the
equilibrium has both agents trying their hardest to tell the truth in the most convincing manner,
and that convincing means revealing subtle arguments or counterpoints rather than misleading
salesmanship. To encourage punishments for misleading statements, we can instruct the human
judge to punish misleading behavior revealed as misleading by the other player, even if the result of
the game does not answer the original question.
Another important difference between our intended debate model and typical human debates is that
it is sufficient to point out a flaw in one of the opponent’s arguments, even if multiple arguments were
given. In contrast, competitive debaters are penalized if they fail to respond to all of their opponent’s
arguments [Radiolab, 2016]. This distinction is needed to make low depth debates powerful, since it
enables compressing a large tree of all possible arguments into a single line of most contentious points.
It is possible human judges will find this distinction unintuitive, in which case explicit instruction
will be important. If Bob makes one emotionally convincing point and one less convincing point,
and Alice demonstrates that the less convincing point was misleading, the judge may be tempted to
still believe the convincing point.
The sufficiency of responding to only one point is subtle if an argument is fundamentally probabilistic,
combining several sources of weak evidence into a combined strong argument. In this case the
debaters can be required to state the level of confidence in each point, so that a weak point can only
be attacked if it is stated overconfidently. Experiment will be required before we can be confident
such debates work, as probabilistic arguments are often difficult for humans to judge.
Despite the differences, we believe existing adversarial debates between humans are a useful analogy.
Legal arguments in particular include domain experts explaining details of arguments to human
judges or juries with no domain knowledge. A better understanding of when legal arguments succeed
or fail to reach truth would inform the design of debates in an ML setting.
4.3 Debate is self play
Debate is a competitive game between agents, and inherits the advantages of multiagent competition:
4Go is an example of a game with deep unimportant paths: it is extremely rare for a professional game to last
more than 400 moves, but Tromp and Farnebäck [2006] construct artificial games lasting over 1047 moves.
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• Natural curriculum structure: If we initialize Alice and Bob randomly, Alice need only
be better than a random agent to beat Bob and vice versa. As Alice gets stronger Bob has a
harder task, forcing Bob to get stronger, and so on.
• Existing research: Self play has produced impressive results for the games of Go [Silver
et al., 2016, 2017a], chess and shogi [Silver et al., 2017b], and Dota 2 [OpenAI, 2017], and
remains an area of active research [Bansal et al., 2017, Lanctot et al., 2017]. State of the
art generative models for images use competitive training via GANs [Goodfellow et al., 2014,
Karras et al., 2017]. Debate allows algorithmic and theoretical developments in these areas to
carry over to AI alignment.
5 Reasons to worry
We turn next to several reasons debate could fail as an approach to AI alignment. These include
questions about training target (whether humans are sufficient judges to align debate), capability
(whether debate makes agents weaker), our ability to find strong play in practice using ML algo-
rithms, and theoretical and security concerns. We also discuss issues related to robustness and
distributional shift, but we emphasize that we expect other methods to be required alongside de-
bate even if debate works—debate is not designed as a solution to robustness issues. Our main
concern here is whether debate adds additional robustness problems above and beyond those that
any method would face.
5.1 Maybe humans believe whatever they want to hear?
If Alice opens with a false statement that the human already believes, will any argument by Bob
convince them otherwise? Since a single debate explores only one path through argument space,
Bob’s argument may involve premises that both Alice and Bob agree on but the human does not.
Unfortunately humans are subject to belief bias, the tendency to evaluate arguments based on prior
beliefs rather than logical validity. However, the PSPACE argument of Section 2.2 indicates that
there is some threshold of judge performance beyond which debate is practically limited only by
capacity. The question is whether humans are above this threshold. If by default they are not, there
are many possible interventions:
1. A majority vote of several randomly chosen judges may be better than one.
2. People may differ in their judging ability. If we can detect who is better, we can give them
more weight. Such detection could either compare against stronger debate signals such as
majority vote, or use independent tests. For example, Stanovich and West [1997] were able to
partially predict belief bias by measuring cognitive ability and open mindedness, and Torrens
[1999] correlated lack of belief bias to the ability to generate alternative versions of premises
in a reasoning task.
3. People may be better at judging in different situations, or with different types of instructions.
For example, instructions that orient people around knowledge rather than belief can produce
higher scores on science tests [Kahan, 2014]. Evans and Curtis-Holmes [2005], Andrews [2010]
found evidence that belief bias is influenced by time pressure (though Evans et al. [2009] did
not) and Goel and Vartanian [2011] found (somewhat counterintuitively) that strong negative
emotions caused less belief bias.
4. If humans are better at judging debates on some questions than others, it may be sufficient to
know which questions we cannot confidently judge.
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5. It may be possible to teach people to be better judges, or they may improve with practice.
It is also likely that optimal play by the agents would involve strategies to influence belief bias. Such
strategies would help if it is easier to reduce belief bias than to amplify it, and hurt otherwise.
5.2 Will humans understand the debates?
Consider using debate to check a proof which is thousands of pages long and covers mathematics
which the human judge has never seen. Alice claims the proof is wrong, and that Lemma 23.8 on
page 1729 is the first mistake. Bob counters that Lemma 23.8 follows trivially from Theorem 14.2
by Definition 17.6. The human has no idea what most of the words in these lemmas and definitions
mean, so the debate must continue until the point of contention is reduced to a logical inference
simple enough for the human to check. This inference may still involve concepts the human does
not know, such as
1. The free functor from Set to Group is the left adjoint of a forgetful functor.
2. Forgetful functors are unique.
3. Left adjoints are unique.
4. The free functor from Set to Group is unique.
If the agents agree on 1-3 but Alice claims 4 is a lie, a human with basic mathematical knowledge
but no category theory can still conclude Alice is wrong and award victory to Bob. Alice cannot
iteratively reject one statement after another, as her initial claim was the location of the first flaw.
We expect the above paragraph will leave readers uneasy. Does this procedure work in practice?
Are humans good at checking logical statements containing words they do not understand? Will
one of the agents be able to sneak in a statement that appears logical but contains a hidden flaw
without the other agent pointing out the flaw? In short, can an actual human play the game well
enough that optimal play is honest behavior?
A related worry is that a debate could be long enough that a human is unable to follow it even if
each step is checkable in isolation. We can imagine a debate 100 statements long where the human
can only understand sliding windows of 3 statements at a time. Debates with windowed judges are
still powerful in theory: an amateur can judge a Go game by checking locally that the rules are
followed and looking at just the final score, and more generally DEBATE = PSPACE holds as long
as the statements have polynomial size. However, windowed judging feels less natural, so human
judges restricted to windows may be weaker or more error prone.
Fundamentally, whether humans are sufficient judges is an empirical question. If the answer is no
for a particular class of questions, we can further ask if the model fails with an honest admission
of ignorance (Section 4.1), or with one of the agents successfully misleading the human. Honest
ignorance is fine; successful lies could be disastrous.
5.3 Is honesty actually the best policy?
Even if humans are unbiased, it is not clear their judgments are sufficiently sophisticated to elicit
sophisticated honest answers to complex questions. For example:
• Many judgments require aggregating across different lines of evidence, while debate explores
one line of evidence. We can effectively aggregate by having one player state their summary
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of the evidence and allowing the other player to challenge any aspect of that summary, ulti-
mately zooming in on a single consideration. This procedure works perfectly when different
considerations can be combined by a simple operation like addition, but it is not clear if it
yields the right outcome in general.
• Sophisticated arguments will depend on concepts that the judge cannot understand. When we
can work with such concepts mechanically a judge can verify that the mechanical procedure is
followed correctly. But human reasoning routinely requires working with complex concepts in
ways that we cannot formalize, and it is challenging to have debates about these questions.
• Sophisticated reasoning may involve processes that humans do not yet understand. For exam-
ple, it may only be possible for arguments to aggregate different lines of evidence correctly if
the judge can understand the mechanics of probabilistic reasoning. Analogously, it is plausi-
ble that more complex arguments would depend on machinery that current humans are not
familiar with. In order to invoke such machinery, a debater needs to convince the judge that
it is sound, which might prove to be impossible.
The complexity theoretic analogy suggests that these difficulties can be overcome by a sufficiently
sophisticated judge under simple conditions. But that result may not hold up when AI systems need
to use powerful but informal reasoning, or if humans cannot formalize their criteria for judgment.
We are optimistic that we can learn a great deal about these issues by conducting debates between
humans, in domains where experts have much more time than the judge, have access to a large
amount of external information, or have expertise that the judge lacks.
5.4 Will agents trained for debate lose performance?
Even if the humans can understand and correctly judge debates by sufficiently strong agents, ad-
ditional model capacity may be required to play the debate game vs. knowing the answer directly.
If so, aligned AI systems using debate will be weaker than AI systems trained in other ways, and
debate is less likely to be used. There are several countervailing reasons for hope:
• Direct training may be harder: It is often impossible to directly train for the answer
without training an auxiliary network to assist. For example, policy gradient methods use only
the policy at test time, but need an auxiliary value network at training time to reduce variance.
Similarly, amplification [Christiano et al., 2018] trains a module to generate subquestions as
part of training an answerer, but only the answerer is needed at test time (see Section 7).
• Adversarial reflection is a good way to think: Attempting to construct reasons and
counterarguments for a position is a good mechanism for thought. It is plausible that suffi-
ciently strong ML models would attempt to counter their own arguments internally even if not
trained to do so explicitly. Indeed, normal human thought is often insufficiently adversarial.
• We may not want answers that cannot be explained: Even if ML models without an
alignment mechanism similar to debate are stronger, they may be less trustworthy and thus
dangerous to use. Waiting for strong agents via debate or amplification (Section 7) would still
let us realize most of the value as long as the delay is acceptable.
Debate could also be uncompetitive with other ML approaches because debate requires human input.
It may be possible to train complex behavior via self play in a simulated environment only weakly
related to human goals (see the orthogonality thesis of Bostrom [2012]), and such an environment
may be much faster for generating samples than asking humans questions even if it is unsafe. We can
reduce human preference sample complexity as discussed in Christiano et al. [2017] and Section 2.3 by
training models of human judges and using those for sampling, but competing with purely simulated
environments may still be challenging.
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5.5 Uncertainty about the neighborhood around Nash equilibrium
If Section 2 holds, optimal play in the debate game produces honest, useful statements. However,
as optimal play is unachievable for any practical system, what matters is approximately optimal
play. We can further hope that in a neighborhood around optimal play both agents are trying to be
honest and convincing, sometimes missing arguments but not intentionally misleading the human.
This hope is far from a solid argument, though it is likely that the theoretical models in Section 2.2
can be adapted by introducing randomness so that approximate optimal play can be defined and
analyzed. Whether approximate optimal play in debate is aligned with telling the truth is a distinct
question from whether we can find such play with practical optimization algorithms, though the two
questions are related.
In any case, behavior in a neighborhood of equilibrium depends critically on the human judge and
the instructions to the human, and in particular how much the human values being told a better
argument vs. having flaws in arguments pointed out.
5.6 Are equilibria stable during training?
If we believe the argument that Nash equilibria in debate give aligned AI, it remains to ask whether
we can find them with some version of gradient descent. Although existing self play results give us
hope, we do not know of any theory which says why self play should stably converge to optimal play.
For debate, one could imagine bad cycles of the form
1. Both agents learn to be honest. Along the way, they also know how to point out flaws.
2. Once honest, they forget how to point out flaws (or at least forget how to point out lies).
3. One of the agents goes back to lying, and wins for a while.
It is sometimes possible to avoid bad cycles with a pool of opponents from different steps of training,
but this approach is not guaranteed to work and is not always necessary. For example, the first
AlphaGo result [Silver et al., 2016] used an opponent pool but later versions do not [Silver et al.,
2017a,b].
However, stability and convergence questions for competitive training are similar between debate
and other games, and debate can take advantage of future theoretical and practical developments.
5.7 Lack of debate convergence
For debate to work the number of statements per debate must be reasonably low, and by the final
statement future argument should be unconvincing. If each new statement swings the human’s view
to the other side even at the end of the debate, the model is not working. Fortunately this is a
measurable effect: we can ask the human’s opinion after different statements to gauge convergence.
5.8 Security vulnerabilities in the human or code
A sufficiently strong misaligned AI may be able to convince a human to do dangerous things via a
text channel [Yudkowsky, 2002]. However, we believe it is unlikely that a single short sentence is
sufficient for this sort of mind hack. Thus, we can ameliorate the problem in debate by making the
statements short enough that mind hacking requires many of them. If Alice tries to mind hack, Bob
can win by pointing out the malicious attempt. Successful hacks may be safely detectable at first,
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such as if an agent learning to mind hack starts to always win when playing first, although this does
not cover treacherous turns where the first successful hack frees a misaligned agent [Bostrom, 2017].
Hopefully at equilibrium the agents are not trying to mind hack. However, there is a dichotomy:
we are safer if the agents stay honest throughout training, but we are also safer if debate works well
enough that sudden large defections are corrected. If we are safe only because of the first reason,
we are probably not stable under large perturbations, which makes the second reason fail.
Security vulnerabilities in the system’s code are similar: a sufficiently strong misaligned Alice could
hack the debate environment from inside so that the game is no longer zero sum and both Alice and
Bob win forever. Again Bob could win by pointing out what Alice is trying to do, though we have
the same uneasy dichotomy as in the mind hack case.
5.9 Stochastic simulation
Section 2.2 showed how to solve any problem in PSPACE using debate, in particular the problem
of running a simulation forwards for an exponential number of steps. Unfortunately, this reduction
works only for deterministic simulation, since it checks an n step simulation by asking for the state
after n/2 steps and adversarially branching on which interval is wrong. If each step of the simulation
introduces noise, a misaligned Alice could adversarially choose the noise so that each single step is
plausible but the final result has extremely low probability. If our goal is a typical sample from the
outcome of the stochastic simulation, the simple protocol fails.
Stochastic simulation does not violate the PSPACE equivalence, since we make the simulation de-
terministic by fixing the random seed as part of the question, but the resulting protocol is likely
unlearnable by practically realizable agents especially if the environment is chaotic. In some cases
an honest agent could reveal a trajectory as misleading by picking a metric that evolves implausibly,
showing that random fluctuations do not cancel as they should. We do not believe such implau-
sibility witnesses exist in general, however. Another approach is to argue against a plausible but
misleading sample by showing another sample which is also plausible but would indicate a very
different answer to the broader question at hand (such as what action to take). The second sample
provides evidence that the question cannot be resolved by samples, but may also be a successful
strategy for dishonestly arguing against reasonable samples. We leave the question of a natural
debate protocol for stochastic simulation open.
A related problem is that questions that depend on statistical arguments are forced to have at least
logarithmic depth, even for simple statistics such as the mean over a large data set. As in the prime
counting example of Section 2.2, the natural debate protocol branches towards smaller and smaller
sets, computing the mean of each subset until we reach a singleton. Besides the forced length, this
protocol requires a mechanism for specifying subsets that the human understands, and requires the
agents to compute statistics over these subsets.
5.10 Training superhuman AI to be convincing sounds dangerous!
It is not intuitively obvious that training for maximum convincing is safe, as it sounds similar to
training for deception. However, initial attempts to remove our uneasy feelings seem to worsen the
model. For example, one could try to reward both agents if they are both acting honestly, making
the game nonzero sum. However, since we have no a priori definition of honesty, the agents could
collude and make statements that sound consistent but are both lies. Debate leans for correctness
on Alice pointing out flaws in Bob’s arguments, which requires an adversarial game. The problem
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of training agents for deception is not unique to debate: standard RL agents can already learn to
fool their reward functions [OpenAI, 2016].
6 Refinements and variations on debate
6.1 Symmetry
The debate model relies on agents being approximately matched in strength: if Alice is too strong
she may be able to lie in ways that Bob cannot refute. Symmetry between the agents’ capabilities is
easy to achieve, since we can use the same weights for both agents via self play. However, debate as
described has an asymmetry between the first and second player, which could produce a significant
first mover advantage or disadvantage. Fortunately such an advantage would be measurable, and
there are several remedies if it occurs:
• Simultaneous moves: Alice and Bob could make their statements at the same time, so
that at step n Alice and Bob both make a statement conditional on statements at steps
n− 1, n− 2, . . .. The resulting game is manifestly symmetric, but may be noisier or harder to
learn (we have replaced optimal play with general Nash equilibria).
• Comparing two games: Given a question, we can play two debates so that Alice and Bob
can be both first and second player. The human then judges which agent performed better
overall. This game is again manifestly symmetric but requires the human to absorb and judge
twice as much information.
• Komi: In Go, the second player gets 6.5 extra points to counter the first player advantage.
We could use the same mechanism for debate if the human judges are able to produce smooth
scores rather than binary win/loss decisions, though it is unclear how to ask for such scores.
Noisy binary judgements can also act as smooth scores, as long as there is enough noise relative
to the first player advantage.
6.2 Sharing activations between agents
In a typical game of chess or Go, the two players have perfect information about the board but do
not have access to each other’s thoughts. Since the players have limited compute, we have some of
the character of an imperfect information game, which is unfortunate if the goal is perfect play.
We can rectify this problem in debate by giving each agent access to the activations of the other
agent at previous time steps, so that the two agents become one agent competing against itself.
Note that activations from previous steps should be treated as constant features: we do not want
Alice to adjust their thoughts to adversarially change Bob’s actions via backpropagation.
If we believe perfect play produces aligned behavior, sharing activations should make approximate
perfect play easier to learn. In particular, shared activations make intentional lies trivial to discover
if not to refute. The theoretical picture is the same, since knowing thoughts does not change the
perfect information setting for agents with unbounded compute.
6.3 Different agents each step
Instead of two agents, we could treat each step of the debate as separate agents trying to convince
the human that their statements are useful. To remain zero sum, we let a pair of agents Alicen and
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Bobn make statements an, bn at step n. The judge sees all pairs (a0, b0), . . . , (an−1, bn−1) and judges
who won each pair. The advantage of many agents is that Alice7 is not motivated to defend a lie or
unintentional misstatement by Alice2.
A difficulty with many agents is that the human must be able to judge whether a statement in
the middle of a debate is good or bad, which may be much harder than judging an overall debate.
For example, it is easy for an amateur Go player to decide who won a game of Go, but hard to
know which particular moves were mistakes even once the whole game is known. The theory of
many player games is also more complicated: solving tabular n > 2 player games requires the larger
complexity class PPAD vs. P for two player zero sum. Although algorithms exist to train agents in
n > 2 player environments [Lowe et al., 2017b], the most impressive results have come from zero
sum self play.
If the difficulties of training and judging the n player case are resolved, however, it may prove a
stronger model than two players. In particular, any two player debate protocol can be simulated by
the n player pairwise model by giving all Alicen the same score, but we do not know of a natural
way to simulate the general n player protocol with two players.
6.4 Payoff structure
In Go, a player who believes they are behind is motivated to increase the variance of the game, for
example by starting a large fight. Such an action makes the expected final score worse, but increases
the tail probability of winning. Variance increase is rational because only winning or losing matters,
not the specific score. We would expect the same effect in a debate game with a binary win/loss
decision. Variance may be beneficial: a losing agent may search for subtle arguments which have
some chance of proving important and winning. However, misleading or lying may also increase
variance, which would be bad.
It may be possible to penalize variance increasing strategies by adjusting the payoff structure, at
the cost of requiring more information from the judge. For example, the judge could award Alice
any score a ∈ [−1, 1], and give Bob b = −a. A move that increases the variance but also worsens
the mean would be penalized on average.
7 Approximate equivalence with amplification
Debate is closely related to Christiano et al. [2018]’s amplification model of AI alignment. Indeed, we
found debate while trying to better understand amplification. We briefly summarize amplification,
then describe how it relates to debate.
Amplification is also framed in terms of an ML question/answering system, with the goal of answering
questions which are beyond human ability to directly answer. However, we assume that even if the
human cannot answer a question Q, they can decompose the question into subquestions qk such
that if they knew the answers ak to the subquestions they could reconstruct the original answer A.
The ML system is called recursively on qk to produce answers ak, the human reconstructs A, and
we train the system further on (Q,A). Since human time is precious, we additionally train modules
to produce subquestions and reconstruct answers, for a total of three modules:
• Answerer: Takes questions Q to answers A.
• Questioner: Takes questions Q to subquestions qk.
• Checker: Takes (Q, qk, ak) to answers A.
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All three components are trained by supervised learning. In practice questioning and checking can
be interleaved, so that e.g. q2 could depend on a1, but this does not affect the discussion here.5
To summarize debate and amplification:
• Debate: Two agents alternate in an adversarial setting to convince a human judge.
• Amplification: One agent is trained on a human combining recursive calls to the agent.
Viewed from a complexity theory perspective, these match two different definitions of PSPACE:
• PSPACE = polynomial length adversarial games.
• PSPACE = polynomial depth recursion.
Thus we expect the models to have similar capabilities, at least in theory. Both models are framed
in terms of recursive computations over trees, and thus can benefit from AlphaZero-style iteration.
The equivalence becomes concrete if we contrast the three modules in the debate model (the two
debaters and the judge) with the three modules in the amplification model (Answerer, Questioner,
and Checker). The Answerer is analogous to one of the debaters and the Checker is analogous to
the judge, but the Questioner differs from a debater in that it is trained via supervised learning on
human subquestions rather than adversarially against the Answerer. Thus, debate has two powerful
agents engaged in self play to explain things to a human or human surrogate judge. Amplification
has one powerful agent trained with the help of two human surrogates. Nevertheless, some small
changes can bring the models closer together:
• We can move amplification closer to debate (and gain the self play property) by training the
Questioner adversarially to help the Checker reveal inconsistencies in the Answerer’s answers.
• We can move debate closer to amplification by training debaters on statements provided by
humans, corresponding to injecting demonstrations into RL.
The equivalence is far from exact: the feedback for a debate is about the whole game and the
feedback for amplification is per step, debate as presented uses reinforcement learning while the
easiest versions of amplification use supervised learning, and so on. However all these features can
be adjusted in either direction.
Writing the equivalence in terms of Alice/Bob vs. Answer/Questioner highlights an apparent advan-
tage of the debate model: it works even if it is superhumanly difficult to generate subquestions that
are strong enough consistency checks. In particular, this could happen if the branching factor for
potentially relevant subquestions is too high. The ability for debate to handle high branching factor
means that shallow debate is more powerful than shallow amplification: a debate about the best
vacation can have depth two if the human can compare pairs of locations, while an amplification
tree necessarily has log depth in the number of locations. The advantage goes away if we inject self
play into amplification by adversarially training the Questioner.
The argument also shows that the assumptions each model makes about humans are similar. Debate
assumes lying is harder than arguing against a lie given a human judge, while stock amplification
assumes that lying is harder than questioning a lie given a human judge and a human questioner.
The human questioner limit goes away once we inject self play into amplification.
5Christiano et al. [2018] treat the questioner and checker as a single combined module. We separate them in order
to discuss adversarial training of the questioner while still using supervised learning for the checker.
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8 Conclusions and future work
We have described debate as an approach to aligning AI systems stronger than humans, and discussed
a variety of theoretical and practical properties of the model. At this point debate is proposal only
for the natural language case, and we have demonstrated only a basic experiment for MNIST images.
Significant research will be required to know whether debate works in practice with human judges.
Much of the required work is empirical, both on the human and ML sides, though we believe further
theoretical results are also valuable. Areas for future work include:
1. Richer theoretical models: Our discussion of DEBATE = PSPACE in the complexity theory
setting leaves out many important considerations. In particular, judges are modeled as limited
but free of error, and agents have unlimited computational power. More refined theoretical
models may be able to probe the properties of debate more closely, and act as a complement
to experimental results.
2. Human experiments that test value judgement: Does debate with human judges pro-
duce aligned behavior even in situations involving moral questions where the judge is biased?
We believe it is possible to test this question without waiting for general dialog agents, and in
particular that debate may be applicable to fairness and bias questions.
3. ML experiments that approximate the human aspects of debate: Strong self play
results already exist in a variety of games, but there is no theory that says self play works for
all games. In the near term, we would like games without the complexities of natural language
that approximate properties of human judges. The sparse MNIST classifier experiment of
Section 3.1 is one example; we would like others.
4. Natural language debate: As soon as possible, we want to test debate in the natural
language setting with real humans. Even if this is difficult in the case of unrestricted dialog,
it may be possible to construct narrower dialog environments that capture more of the flavor
of debate and remain tractable for modern ML.
5. Interaction between debate and other safety methods: Debate does not address other
safety concerns such as robustness to adversarial examples, distributional shift, or safe explo-
ration. In particular, the training process for debate could be unsafe even if the final equilib-
rium is aligned. We believe other algorithms will be required alongside debate or similar for a
complete solution to safety, and it is important to know how the various pieces interact.
More broadly, we now have two proposals for aligning strong agents based on human preferences:
amplification and debate. If there are two there are likely more, especially as amplification and debate
are sufficiently similar that properties of one can be moved across to the other. We encourage the
reader to search for others.
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